The present paper surveys applications of game theory in the positive literature on judicial decision-making. As in other fields, game-theoretic models of judicial decision-making often greatly simplify reality and cannot claim to rest on incontrovertible assumptions. Judges are supposed to be rational agents acting in purposive, forward-looking fashion with transitive and cardinally ordered preferences.
The use of game theory to model judicial behaviour is motivated by the understanding that judging has a strategic dimension. Judicial decisions are not made in a vacuum. Judges are aware that their decisions may bring about reactions. Legislators may respond to their rulings by passing override legislation, by stripping the court of its jurisdiction, by cutting its budget or, worse, by starting an impeachment procedure. Similarly, unless they themselves sit at the top of the judicial pyramid, judges are aware that their judgments may be reversed by the appellate or supreme court. So, in order to advance their interpretation of the law or any other policy goal, they know they need to anticipate the social responses elicited by their own behaviour.
As in other fields, game-theoretic models of judicial decision-making often greatly simplify reality and cannot claim to rest on incontrovertible assumptions. Judges are supposed to be rational agents acting in purposive, forward-looking fashion with transitive and cardinally ordered preferences.
More importantly perhaps, they are supposed to engage in complex calculations -carefully weighing costs and benefits while computing their probability and discount factor -before making any choice. Still, even though no single model may ever be able to capture all the complexities and intricacies of judging, game theoretic models provide a useful consistencycheck for the development of more sophisticated theories of the judicial process. By making all assumptions explicit and forcing us to work out their exact implications, game theory brings discipline to our intuitions and helps us in identifying the exact set of conditions under which a particular outcome will obtain.
The present paper surveys applications of game theory in the positive literature on judicial decision-making. 1 As we shall see, scholars have tried 1 This is not to say that models which have a more explicitly or directly normative purpose are not interesting. They certainly are. Many of the models presented in the law and economics literature serve to back what are in fact policy recommendations addressed to the courts. Other normative applications, most notably in institutional economics and political economy, focus on the broader issue of institutional choice. Maskin and Tirole (2004) for example compare various policy-making regimes and their impact on public welfare depending on whether elected officials are ready to pander to the electorate to gain re-election, the probability that judicial preferences are congruent with those of the population, the policy expertise of the average citizen, the cost of acquiring information, etc.
They conclude that the most important decisions should be taken by elected officials while technical issues are better allocated to judges. They also suggest that the judicial regime does better than both direct and representative democracy when the majority's preferences are very likely to inflict large negative externalities on a minority. Arguably models of this kind can be used as positive models to make predictions about real world institutions (e.g. one implication of the Maskin and Tirole's model would be that minority rights are better protected, other things being equal, in countries with a strong judiciary). However, these models rest on broad assumptions about judicial motives and, because they focus on institutional choice, they do little to explain or predict variations in judicial outcomes. The same goes for the aforementioned law and economics models. They may offer guidance as to how judges ought to decide cases, but they are of very little avail when it comes to make to model various aspects of the strategic environment in which judges operate. Most of the early applications of game theory to judicial behaviour concentrated on the interactions between the courts and the other branches of power. More recently, scholars have tried to address the internal deliberative process of judicial institutions, to predict how judges sitting on the same court may engage in bargaining with each others to ensure that the final outcome is as close as possible to their ideal point. Meanwhile, others have sought to model interactions between judges sitting on different courts through the doctrine of precedent and the hierarchical structure of the judiciary. I'll conclude with a brief consideration of issues that have been neglected by the existing literature and some suggestions for future research.
Courts and the Separation of Powers
The emergence of game theoretic models of judicial decision-making coincides with the expansion of the rational choice variant of the neoinstitutional paradigm in American political science. Drawing on the work of modern Congressional scholars who had tried to model relations among legislative committees or between legislators and administrative agencies (Shepsle and Weingast 1987) , Marks (1988), Gelly and Spiller (1990) and Eskridge (1991a, b) considered the potential for Congress to overturn the decisions of the Supreme Court. predictions about how judges will decide cases in fact -the focus of the models reviewed in this paper.
Judicial Decision-Making and Political Fragmentation Figure 1 .1 depicts the extended form of the game laid out by Eskridge (1991) , admittedly one of the most accessible and influential among the early studies of the judicial process using insights from game theory.
At the initial stage of the sequence of play, the Court interprets a federal statute. Next the relevant congressional committee has to decide how to react to the ruling. The committee may choose to do nothing, in which case the ruling is left untouched. But it may also decide to refer to Congress a bill overturning the ruling. If it does, Congress will have to choose whether to adopt or to reject this attempt to override the Court. If Congress adopts the bill (or a modified version thereof), the President will have to decide whether to veto the bill or to sign it into law. Then, if the President puts his veto, Congress will have to decide by a two-third majority whether to Adapted from : Eskridge 1991b override it. With the strategic space thus specified, identifying the set of conditions under which Supreme Court decisions can be reversed is relatively straightforward if we assume that each player will choose the course of action that achieves the outcome which is as close as possible to her ideological ideal point in the knowledge the other players will do the same. As in Figure 1 .2, the players' preferences can be arrayed on a single-peaked, one dimensional policy space. Here liberal-conservative. The letters stand for the ideal points of the different actors. J denotes the preferred position of the Supreme Court; M is the preferred position of the median member of Congress 2 ; V denotes the "veto median", the point at which one third of the legislators are on one side of the policy outcome and two-thirds on the other (that is on the side of C); P is the ideal point of the President; and C represents the most preferred position of the key committees in Congress that decide whether to propose a bill to their respective houses, while C(M) denotes the committees' indifference point in relation with M (they have no preference for a policy at M over a policy at C(M) and vice-versa). In the situation depicted in Figure 1 .2, Eskridge's Separation-of-Powers Game predicts the Supreme Court will be able to vote its preferred position into its decision. The congressional committees will not want to send a bill to the floor because the ideal point of Congress (M) is not closer to the their ideal point (C) than a Court decision at (J). Note, moreover, that (J) coincides with (P) and (V). This means that even if the committees preferred (M) to a Court decision on (J) and sent a bill to the floor, the President would put his veto and Congress would lack the two-thirds majority required to override it. The outcome x = J satisfies the definition of a Nash equilibrium: no player will get better off by unilaterally deviating from it.
In Eskridge's model, this equilibrium holds as long as the Supreme Court's ideal point lies within the interval [M, C(M)], i.e. as long as the congressional committees' preferred position is not closer to (M) than it is to (J). By contrast, when the Court"s ideal point lies outside this interval, an outcome on its ideal point will not be in equilibrium. Consider the situation represented in Figure 1 .3. Were the Court to issue a ruling at its ideal point or anywhere to the right of C(M), the committees would want to send a bill to the floor of Congress because an outcome at (M) would make them better off. So the Court's best strategy in that situation is to behave strategically and issue a ruling at (C(M)) so that committees have nothing to gain from sending a bill to Congress. A ruling at (C(M)) is in equilibrium. 
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Adapted from : Eskridge 1991b J codecision game to prevent the enactment of override legislation. Similar to the US Supreme Court, the model predicts that ideological fragmentation among the actors of the legislative process will result in equilibrium outcomes favourable to the ECJ. Figure 2 .2 illustrates one such outcome. 
Imperfect Information, Public Support and Legislative-Judicial Relations
Describing the interactions between a court and a legislature as a twoplayer game, the model put forward by Vanberg (2005) goes some way to address these limitations. Incorporating public support for the court and transparency (the public's awareness that the policy issue under consideration is being dealt with by the Court and the legislature) as parameters of legislative and judicial behaviour, it also demonstrates how stratagem designed to encourage the Commission to bring more cases), this fact would suggest that many attempts to override the Court are nipped in the bud, as it were, because the Commission is able to prevent override proposals from being made in the first place through its agenda-setting monopoly. For students of EU judicial politics, alas, this means that documenting the size of the phenomenon will be difficult, if not impossible, because override attempts leave few apparent traces in the legislative process. public opinion can strengthen judicial power even in strongly majoritarian systems where political fragmentation is low. 
to the Legislature, which will decide whether to evade or to obey the judicial veto. In the model, the Legislature's utility function has three components:
(1) legislators want to implement their policy preferences and receive α whenever they achieve to do so; but (2) legislating is costly and legislators have to pay cost ε every time they choose to legislate (with α > ε > 0); (3) moreover, attempts to evade judicial pronouncements may result in a public backlash if the public backs the Court, damaging the Legislature's political capital with cost β (with β > 0). As to the Court's utility function, it has two elements: (1) the court wants the law to reflect it preferred policy, so it gains A whenever its preferred policy is implemented (A > 0); (2) the court wants to avoid non-compliance on the part of the legislature, so it pays institutional cost I when the legislature evades its decision (I > 0).
Obviously, the players' payoffs depend on whether the public backs the Court and on whether the Court is convergent or not. However, neither the judges, nor the members of the legislature know for sure whether the public will back the Court in the event of a showdown. Similarly, at the initial drafting stage, when they have to decide whether to legislate, the legislators do not know with certainty whether the Court shares their policy preferences.
From these assumptions we can derive six perfect Bayesian equilibria corresponding to positions of varying judicial strength vis-à-vis the legislature. In Figure 3 .2 the six equilibria are plotted against the parameters of public support and ideological divergence (i.e. the probability that the Court will not be convergent). 
10 , then the Legislature will decide not to evade the veto (~E). At the previous stage, the non-convergent Court, knowing the Legislature will not want to evade its ruling, will not hesitate to veto the Legislature's bill. With no need to worry about its institutional standing, the non-convergent Court is strictly better off using its veto (A > 0). Knowing that, the Legislature's decision to legislate at the drafting stage will depend on whether legislators believe the Court is likely to be convergent. If the expected payoff from the Court being 10 This formula simply captures the fact that the legislature has to weigh the probability of a successful evasion (i.e. (1-q) (α-ε)) as well as that of an unsuccessful evasion (p(-β-ε)) against the cost of compliance (-ε). Vanberg's model has many interesting implications. One is that high rates of judicial annulments are most likely to be found where a powerful court faces legislators who often wrongly believe that the judges are on their side. Where legislators expect -rightly or wrongly -the court to be divergent, the model predicts that, other things being equal, they will prefer to refrain from legislating. The studies of Christine Landfried on the German legislative process (Landfried, 1984) and Alec Stone on French judicial politics (Stone, 1992) are consistent with this prediction. They show that the fear of judicial annulment may induce self-censorship on the part of legislative majorities. German politicians call the phenomenon "Karlsruhe Astrologie". Trying to guess how the judges will respond to their policy initiatives, the legislators prefer to water down their bills or abandon them altogether rather than endure a judicial veto (von Beyme, 1997: 311) .
Meanwhile, the model suggests that courts are likely to be the weakest where they enjoy little public support and legislators feel safe to evade rulings they dislike, as would seem to be the case with the Russian Constitutional Court (Epstein et al. 2001 ).
The comparative statics enables us to work out how changes in the model's parameters can lead to a change in the prevailing equilibrium. While spatial voting analysis suggests that the opinion-assigner can indirectly influence the content of the final opinion, its exact content, however, will devolve on whether the assignee is able to present her draft opinion as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. If she is, then she will be able to pick the point closest to her preferred position in the Win-Set (Hammond et al. 2005) . If she is not -that is, if the other judges can amend her proposalthe final outcome should be somewhat closer to the median judge on the relevant issue dimension. There is no closed rule prohibiting counter-offers in the US Supreme Court deliberation protocol. So some scholars have considered models that make both the assignee and the assigner irrelevant.
In these models, the opinion of the court, just as the decision on the merits, Of the more recent attempts to model adjudication on collegial courts, Cameron and Kornhauser (2010) is admittedly the most developed and refined. Unlike pre-existing models, which generally conflate decisionmaking over case dispositions and decision-making over policies (opinions), 11 they carefully distinguish dispute resolution and policy-making, which are conceptualised as both distinct and interrelated. 12 The sequence of play in their adjudication game is as follows:
11 Carrubba et al. (2008) was the notable exception. 12 The content of an opinion is defined as a rule or function mapping cases into dispositions.
A rule has a cut-point x in policy space X establishing two equivalence classes with respect to dispositions. (Dispositions are thus conceived as dichotomous, i.e. "for Claimant" or "for Defendant".) For any case x , the rule yields the "correct" disposition:
Where 0 indicates one disposition and 1 the other. Arguably, many legal rules take this form. Speed limits are an obvious example. They employ a cut-point to mark off the class of acceptable driving behaviour from the class of reprehensible driving behaviour potentially facing legal sanctions. For instance, if 60 mph is the cut-point, a driver exceeding the limit will normally fall in the class of reprehensible behaviour while a driver below the limit will normally fall in the class of accepted driving behaviour. Of course, a lower or higher cut-1. A case x arrives.
2. A judge j is designated, who writes an opinion j x .
3. Acting simultaneously, the non-writing judges first choose whether to join the opinion.
4. Then they vote on the disposition of the case.
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudential norms, the pair of actions {3,4} must obey the endorsement-consistency constraint: if a judge decides to join opinion j x , she must also vote for the case disposition entailed by j x . In other words, if the rule spelled out in the opinion entails that the defendant should win, a judge cannot join the opinion and then cast a vote for the plaintiff. and i x . The larger the distance, the larger the incurred loss. If she declines to join the opinion, she does not suffer this loss but she must pay the effort cost k required to write a concurring or dissenting opinion. Finally, if her dispositional vote is not in accord with her preferred disposition of the case, she incurs a dispositional loss γ (γ ≤ 0). 13 Although the writing judge cares about case disposition and opinion content too, her utility function differs in three respects. First, she cares about the number of joins received by her opinion. She wants her opinion to be as authoritative as possible.
Accordingly, provided her opinion is compatible with the majority-winning disposition, she receives β for each additional join. Second, given that she must write an opinion anyway, she does not face any relevant writing cost.
However, she cares whether a majority of the judges are in dissent and she suffers a large loss κ when she fails to author a majority-disposition compatible opinion. Cameron and Kornhauser requireκ to be large enough so that the most attractive majority-disposition incompatible opinion is always worse for the author than the least attractive majority-disposition 13 Accordingly, the utility function of judge i over dispositional
given opinion j x and case x is defined as:
is the indicator function defined as:
compatible opinion (Cameron and Kornhauser 2010: 17) . In short, the writing judge is always better off penning an opinion with majority support. 14 Equilibrium strategy profiles are derived from these specifications, using backward induction. Starting from the last stage of the game, the dispositional vote, we easily see that a non-writing judge should vote for the disposition reflecting her ideal point i x , unless she joins the opinion j x , in which case she must vote for the disposition required by the opinion. At the join decision stage, the non-author must weigh the payoff associated with a join against the payoff associated with a decision not to join. Each judge has a join region around her ideal-point. Her join decision calculus can thus be represented by the function in Figure 6 .2. 
Set of endorsable opinions
The horizontal axis represents both the case and the policy space, while the vertical axis indicates the probability to join (1 = join, 0 = not join). Consequently, Judge 9 must locate her opinion to the left of that point.
Figure 6.3. Dissent Function and Aggregate Join Function
The location she will choose within the majority-disposition compatibility set will depend on how much she values authoritativeness. If the value of additional join β > 0.1, she will want to move further away from her ideal point to write an opinion at j x = 0.625 that will receive five joins in addition to her own (recall that the author is assumed to join her own opinion). If the value she puts on joins is comparatively lower, β ≤ 0.1, then j x = 0.725 will be the equilibrium opinion.
Another interesting implication of the model is that the relation between opinion content and opinion assignment is non-monotonic: Second, opinion location is not monotonic in ideal point of the opinion 15 Extreme case location will result in a unanimous dispositional vote. author. As we can see, Judges 3 through 7 write opinions at their ideal point. Because they occupy the court's middle ground, they need not deviate from their preferred rule to garner joins. In contrast, Judges 2 and 8 do.
They are respectively better off writing an opinion slightly to the right and slightly to the left of their ideal point. What is more, Judges 1 and 9 write opinions that are even more moderate. Because they do not have to worry about losing the join of a more extreme judge, they can move towards the centre to seek additional joins.
Judges and Future Judges: Modelling the Effect of Precedents on Judicial Decision-Making
Especially in Common Law countries, where courts are supposed to follow the doctrine of stare decisis, but also in Civil Law jurisdictions where past judicial rulings are regularly invoked as constituting an authoritative guide for present decisions, precedents are believed to affect judicial behaviour significantly. Arguably, this means that judges sometimes forego what would otherwise be their favourite outcome because a past decision suggests a different conclusion. Rasmusen (1994) seeks to uncover the conditions under which judges will do so by modelling interactions among past, present and future judges as an infinitely repeated game. In his model, the players' payoffs reflect the cost of following past precedents and the gain derived from having their own precedents followed. Infinite repetition makes strategies possible that would not be sustainable in finite games. In a finite game, the expectation that judges will follow precedent may rapidly unravel as judges face the temptation to free-ride on their colleagues. On the other hand, when the game is repeated an infinite number of times punishing defectors becomes possible and this alone may suffice to deter defection and ensure cooperation. Rasmusen examines the following six strategy profiles from the standpoint of judge j in a infinite sequence of judges:
(1) Strategy: Violate every precedent. Outcome: Every judge violates every precedent (Judicial Breakdown Equilibrium).
(2) Strategy: Obey every precedent unless some previous judge has violated a precedent. In that case violate every precedent.
Outcome: Every judge obeys very precedent (Punishment Breakdown Equilibrium).
(3) Strategy: Obey the precedent of judge j -i, for i = 1,…,n, if she "retained legitimacy", and violate it otherwise. Judge j -i is considered to have "retained legitimacy" if she herself followed this strategy. Outcome: Every judge follows every precedent (Specific Punishment Equilibrium).
(4) Strategy: Obey the precedent of judge j -i, for i = 1,…,n -1, if she "retained legitimacy", and violate it otherwise. Violate the precedent of judge j -n. Judge j -i is considered to have "retained legitimacy" if she herself followed this strategy or obeyed all n precedents. Outcome: Every judge obeys n -1 precedents and violates one precedent (Lax Specific Punishment Equilibrium).
(5) Strategy: Obey the precedent of every judge. Outcome (if all judges follow the strategy): Every judge follows every precedent.
(6) Strategy: Obey the precedent of every judge unless the immediately preceding judge violated any precedent. In that case, violate every precedent. Outcome (if all judges follow the strategy):
Every judge obeys every precedent.
Unlike the other four, (5) and (6) are not equilibrium strategies. (5) is not a stable equilibrium for the simple, aforementioned reason: if obeying precedent is costly, then j is better off deviating from the strategy. (6) is not a stable strategy profile because punishment is not credible. Consider the situation of judge j after judge j -1 has violated a precedent. If she follows the strategy, then judge j + 1 will also violate all precedents if she in turn follows the strategy. However, as long as the gain from having her precedent followed is greater than the cost of obeying precedents, judge j will be better off obeying all precedents and foregoing punishment so that j + 1 and all subsequent judges uphold her precedent. In other words, the strategy is not stable because punishment costs the punisher too much. On the face of things, strategy (2) appears similar to (6). But in fact it is more effective because no single judge has the power to stop the destructive consequence of her predecessor's deviation. To continue the previous example, after judge j -1 has violated a precedent, j has no interest in foregoing punishment, since j + 1 will violate precedent anyway.
As in other infinitely repeated games, the existence of multiple Nash equilibria underscores the importance of initial expectations. When the gain from having one's favourite holding followed outweighs the cost of obeying past precedents, the Punishment Breakdown, the Specific Punishment and what matters for the courts is that the case disposition corresponds to what their preferred doctrine requires irrespective of the doctrine actually invoked to justify that disposition. In the example depicted in Figure 7 .2, for x < xL, the doctrines respectively favoured by L and H, different though they are (xL ≠ xH), nonetheless entail the same case disposition (= admit evidence in the search and seizure example). Now this means that from both H and L's perspective whether that outcome is justified by one doctrine or the other is indifferent.
17 Assuming xL < xH (which can be readily interpreted as meaning that L is more liberal than H), L's utility function can be defined as : 
lower court knows the size and location of the high court's Uncertworthy Region (UR). This region corresponds to the set of cases where the gain derived from correcting a contrary decision is less or equal to the cost of auditing. Formally, if xH -k < x < xH + k, H is better off letting the lower court's decision stand. L may thus safely deviate from H's doctrine when contentious cases fall within UR. On the other hand, when contentious cases fall in the Certworthy Region (CR) L is better off complying. Consequently, in equilibrium H never reviews any lower court decision.
Lax shows that procedural rules may work to reduce the size of UR.
On the US Supreme Court, the decision to review a case (to grant certiorari) is subject to the famous Rule of Four: it takes the votes of four Justices to get a case heard by the Court. As illustrated in Figure 7 
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In a repeated version of the game and assuming imperfect information, conditions can be identified under which the shortfall in Supreme Court control may be totally eliminated. From Figure 7 .3 we can see that complete compliance could be ensured if Justice4 were thought to be slightly more liberal or Justice6 slightly more conservative. In a repeated game -the normal configuration for interactions between higher and lower courts -judges may thus have an incentive to appear more extreme than they really are. Provided the gain from ensuring total compliance in future cases is sufficiently high, the cert-pivots (Justice4 and Justice6 in Figure 7 .3) will want to grant certiorari to a case falling within their UR to signal "toughness". Lax considers a refinement of his basic model in which the high court interacts with lower courts over two periods of play. In the first period, a case x1 is adjudicated by the lower court L1. After that the high court decides whether to grant certiorari and, in the event it does, whether to reverse or to affirm L1's decision. In the second period, the lower court L2, which has the same indifference point as L1, must decide n cases at x2 18 having observed H's behaviour in reaction to L1's decision in the first period.
Finally, H must decide whether to review each of these cases. If certiorari is granted, then the case is decided as per the median Justice's indifference point. The relevant cert-pivot, i.e. the conservative one for liberal lower courts and the liberal one for conservative lower courts, may be of two types:
18 Picked from the uniform distribution on the case space X (unit interval from 0 to 1). This means that the n cases may or may not fall within the conflict region.
either moderate (his/her UR overlaps with the median's own UR) or extreme (no overlap with median's UR). Now, L1's strategy in the first period and for cases falling in the region of conflict will depend on the initial probability that the relevant certpivot is of the moderate or extreme type. A conservative cert-pivot of the extreme type will always grant certiorari to reverse decisions that are more liberal than the median Justice. A conservative cert-pivot of the moderate type, by contrast, would normally not review a liberal decision falling in the conflict region, except if the expected gain from compliance in the second period outweighs the net cost of review in the first. 19 This is because granting certiorari may help persuade L2 that the relevant cert-pivot is of the extreme type, which in turn would make compliance more likely in the second period. Going back to the choice faced by L1 in the first period, we realise that L1 must also deal with the risk that the moderate type uses its case for a strategic reversal. Other things being equal, the higher the initial probability that the cert-pivot is of the extreme type, the stronger the incentive for the moderate type to mimic the behaviour of the extreme type.
A high initial probability of an extreme type may thus induce L1 to comply pre-emptively.
Of course, pre-emptive compliance by L1 rules out the possibility for the cert-pivot to reverse the decision to signal extremeness. However, in this situation affirmance can be used as an alternative signal. Affirmance is a costlier signal, since, unlike reversal, it does not have the added benefit of correct a lower court mistake. Paradoxical though it may seem, it constitutes for that very reason a more convincing signal of extremeness for the lower courts. If the prospect of greater compliance in the second period is attractive enough, both the moderate and the extreme type will want to review and affirm at least some cases of compliance in the first period.
In the second period, L2 updates the probability that the relevant cert-pivot is of the extreme type after observing his/her behaviour in the first period. 20
If non-compliance and a failure to grant certiorari are observed, then the moderate type is revealed and L2 can safely decline compliance with the high court's doctrine in the conflict region. In other circumstances -noncompliance followed by reversal, compliance followed by affirmance, and compliance followed by denial of certiorari -the extent of L2's compliance varies according to the location of x2 and the initial probability that the certpivot is of the extreme type (Lax 2003: 77-81) .
20 L2 does so applying Bayes' Theorem. Bayes' Theorem states how to modify the probability of an hypothesis so as to take into account new evidence:
is the posterior probability of the hypothesis H given new evidence E;
) ( H E P
is the conditional probability of observing E if H were true; ) (H P is the prior probability that H is true that was inferred before the observation of E; and ) (E P is the probability of observing E under all possible hypotheses (marginal probability of E).
Conclusion: Beyond the American Judiciary
As can be seen from the foregoing survey of the literature, the application of game theory to judicial institutions has been a largely American affair. The truth is this literature is almost entirely the product of American scholars.
And it comes as little surprise that most of models have been developed with a view to explain features of the American judiciary. Rare are those that have been developed with another context in mind. Vanberg (2005) and Carrubba (2005 and ) are the exception, not the rule.
Thus much work remains to be done to develop models addressing the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of judicial institutions outside the United States. In Europe, the rules governing the courts' internal deliberation process often differ from those found in the United States: in abstract review proceedings constitutional courts can decide policy matters without simultaneously having to adjudicate a specific dispute; the invalidation of governmental acts is sometimes subject to a supermajority requirement; judges do not always have the right to file separate opinions, etc. These differences seriously limit the relevance of models geared to the US judicial process.
Another important feature of judicial behaviour outside the United States is that interactions between courts may take place outside a hierarchical framework. The European Union is a case in point. The
European Court of Justice has a complex relationship with the courts operating in its Member States. While ordinary and lower instance courts have displayed an impressive degree of willingness to cooperate with the 42 ECJ, constitutional courts have proved more recalcitrant. The German Federal Constitutional Court in particular has made repeated threats of defiance The relationship between this court and the ECJ has many characteristics of a Hawk-Dove game. Each player wants to expand or maintain his turf at the other's expense. But both face a tremendous cost in the case of outright confrontation, which would bring about a Europeanscale constitutional crisis (Dyevre 2011) . In any case, all these are issues that may benefit from formalization using game theory's rich insights.
